Whom Do We Trust?

Christian division as a crisis of testimony – a view by the County Ecumenical Officer

15-Minute Read

The key assumption that underpins much of ecumenical work is that the problem we face is one of deep-seated disagreement.  As we differ in doctrine, practice and emphases, we understandably seek (mainly patiently and prayerfully) to resolve those differences through dialogue.  However, a key question for me is what if disagreement is not the deepest issue?  What if, beneath our theological divisions, there lies something more fundamental – an issue of trust?

To explore this, it is helpful to step into the world of epistemology (the philosophy of how we know what we know).  In particular, I want to draw on the work of the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid and, more recently, the Australian philosopher C. A. J. (Tony) Coady.  Both offer the important insight that much of what we know depends not upon direct evidence, but upon testimony.  In other words, we believe many of the things we do because others tell us they are so and, crucially, because we trust them.

Reid’s contribution is especially significant because he was responding to the deep scepticism that emerged within early modern philosophy, particularly in the work of David Hume.  Thinkers such as Hume, following the wider empiricist tradition associated with John Locke and George Berkeley, argued that knowledge derives ultimately from sense experience and the ideas formed within the mind.  Hume pressed this approach toward increasingly sceptical conclusions, questioning whether we possess sufficient rational grounds for many of the assumptions on which ordinary life depends.  He argued that if we cannot directly experience something with our senses, we cannot rationally prove it exists.

Taken to its extreme logical conclusion, this means that if we only know things through passing sensory experiences, we cannot actually prove basic realities. This challenges foundational beliefs we take for granted such as the future or cause and effect.  For example, we cannot logically prove that the sun will rise tomorrow, that physical objects exist when we look away, or that one thing truly causes another. This extreme doubt we call scepticism, and Reid believed it undermines the very possibility of human knowing.  His response was to argue that human beings are naturally disposed to speak truthfully and to trust the testimony of others.  These tendencies are part of the basic structure of human social existence.

For clarity, this does not mean that people never deceive or that testimony should be accepted uncritically.  Reid’s point is (rather) that universal suspicion (scepticism) cannot function as the starting point for human life.  Humans learn language, history, morality, and religion by trusting others long before they are capable of independently verifying what they are taught.  Testimony, therefore, is not a secondary source of knowledge that we cautiously permit after proof has been established elsewhere.  In fact, it is one of the conditions that makes knowledge and society possible at all.

I find this deeply persuasive, not least as a Christian.  In essence, Reid’s argument suggests that trust is primary and suspicion secondary.  We begin by trusting and learn (through experience and discernment) when caution becomes necessary.

Coady develops this insight within contemporary analytic philosophy.  He challenges the assumption that testimony must always be reduced to other forms of evidence such as perception, inference, or independent verification.  He argues that such a standard in practice is impossible.  If we refused to accept anything without always personally confirming it ourselves, the overwhelming majority of what we claim to know would simply disappear.

In my opinion, this has to be correct.  Our knowledge of history, science, current events, and even much of ordinary daily life depends upon accepting the word of others.  Knowledge, in other words, is not merely individual, it is social.  For Coady, then, to receive testimony is to participate in a network of credibility, authority, and mutual accountability, where communities themselves are sustained by habits of trust.

This is where both Reid and Coady are important for ecumenism.  Because, if human knowledge itself depends upon trustworthy testimony, then the divisions within the Church reveal something more than doctrinal disagreement.  In fact, they reveal a fracture in the credibility we grant one another as witnesses to the truth of the Gospel.

This has direct implications for the Church because, at its heart, it is a community of testimony.  Scripture itself is received as testimony.  Tradition is the handing on of testimony.   And Faith is (in many cases) awakened through testimony.  The Church, if nothing else, lives by hearing, receiving, and bearing witness.  If Reid’s perspective is accurate, trust is not optional but fundamental.  If Coady’s view holds, this trust extends beyond interpersonal relationships and is inherently ecclesial; that is, to trust the collective integrity, history, and structure of the Church as one community.

Another way of expressing this is to think about trust within a small team at work or a rugby club. When people belong to the same organisation and share clear ethical standards, trust grows from that common identity and commitment. The ecclesial parallel is similar; namely, Christians can trust one another across denominational lines because they recognise themselves as belonging to the same spiritual family.

When we look honestly at denominational life, however, it is clear that this trust often remains fragile. I do not want to exaggerate the problem, but in my experience disagreements frequently extend beyond simple differences of opinion. Although relations between churches are far better than in the past, there is still a tendency (especially outside committed ecumenical circles) to approach one another’s statements with a degree of suspicion. This persists even as Church leaders publicly encourage dialogue and work towards greater mutual understanding. Many Christians still assume, often unconsciously, that another tradition is somehow mistaken, selective, or distorted in its interpretation of Scripture and Tradition.

Seen through Reid’s eyes, this represents a reversal of our proper epistemic posture.  Instead of beginning with trust and refining it through discernment, we begin with doubt and allow trust only cautiously - if at all.  Seen through Coady’s perspective, the consequences are serious; that is, the weakening of shared credibility undermines the very conditions under which knowledge can be held in common.  

I would put it this way.  Within the Church we are not disagreeing within a shared framework of trust, what we are actually doing is questioning the reliability of one another as credible witnesses.  The reality is that (unconsciously or not) we do not fully trust one another as true bearers of the Gospel.

The work of one of my favourite living philosophers, Onora O’Neill, a Life Peer and former Chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, is particularly helpful here because her focus is not simply on trust as a feeling or personal attitude, but on trustworthiness as a moral and institutional quality that must be embodied and sustained.

She argues persuasively that in modern society we speak endlessly about trust while paying insufficient attention to trustworthiness - which is the objective quality of being dependable and deserving of trust. O'Neill argues that society's current obsession with "restoring trust" is fundamentally misguided. Trust is merely a subjective reaction or feeling, whereas trustworthiness is a property of an agent or institution that must be earned through evidence-based behaviour. For her, the central issue is not simply whether people are willing to trust, but whether individuals and institutions conduct themselves in ways that genuinely merit trust in the first place – a key distinction.

Applied to the Church, this means that trust cannot simply be demanded nor restored through rhetoric alone.  Rather, it depends upon truthfulness that requires consistency, honesty about limitations, and a willingness to be accountable.  In other words, trustworthiness is an ethical practice before it becomes a social achievement.  Once this is recognised, the ecumenical implications become difficult to avoid.  If Christian communities are to receive one another as credible witnesses to the Gospel, then the task is not merely to persuade one another intellectually, but to embody forms of life that are recognisably trustworthy.

O’Neill’s insight also helps explain why ecclesial distrust can become so deeply entrenched.  Where traditions sense defensiveness, selective honesty, historical amnesia, or an unwillingness to acknowledge failure, suspicion naturally deepens.  Conversely, trust tends to grow where there is intellectual humility, transparency, consistency of witness, and the visible practice of repentance and accountability.  In this context, restoring ecumenical trust constitutes a fundamentally moral and spiritual responsibility rather than merely an exercise in public relations or confessional diplomacy.

Going back to the idea of trust in testimony, then, once this breaks down dialogue between churches becomes significantly more difficult.  Arguments are no longer received as sincere attempts to articulate truth, but as positions to be defended or resisted.  Evidence is then filtered through suspicion and even agreement (when it does occur) can feel fragile or at best superficial.  Ecumenical conversations, in this light, risk becoming exchanges between parties who are not only divided in belief but divided in their willingness to recognise one another as trustworthy brothers and sisters in Christ.

This suggests that the path toward Christian unity requires the building up of trust, through trustworthiness, as both an epistemic condition and (in my opinion) an unavoidable moral requirement.  The reason I say moral requirement is that trust, at least as discussed here, clearly emerges as an ethical obligation rooted in our rational nature.  That is, to treat another as a rational agent is, in part, to take seriously their capacity to bear and communicate truth.  A habitual refusal to trust (without good reason) risks collapsing into a form of epistemic disrespect, where the other is not fully recognised as a co-participant in reason and rationality.

Within the Church, this perspective takes on a specifically ecclesial character.  Since we are united as members of the Body of Christ, it would not make sense for our default attitude toward each other to be one of ongoing suspicion.  Instead, we should cultivate ecclesial virtues of trust and trustworthiness; namely, the habit of being open to others’ testimonies as possibly truthful, even if we anticipate disagreement.  In other words, we ought to approach each other with moral openness shaped by our common commitment to the truth.

Saying that, however, we do need to be cautious.  I am not suggesting that testimony should be accepted uncritically.  Clearly, testimony can mislead, traditions can be in error, and power, history, and institutional interests can all distort what is presented as truth.  Indeed, I would argue that divisions within Christianity are, at least in part, the result of precisely such failures of trustworthy witness.  The task, therefore, is not to abandon discernment, but to hold together two demands that are often pulled apart - the need for critical evaluation and the obligation to remain open to receiving truth from beyond one’s own tradition.  

For ecumenism, this means that alongside doctrinal dialogue there must be sustained attention to the conditions under which trust can grow.  These conditions include, inter alia, consistency of witness, intellectual honesty, humility, and a demonstrable willingness to be corrected.  Trust is not simply declared blindly, it is earned over time through trustworthiness, which suggests that ecumenical encounters beyond formal debate matter deeply.  Trust, at least in this sense, is then cultivated through listening, shared prayer, common service, and the gradual recognition of integrity in one another’s denominations.

This argument does, however, face a major challenge.  If (as we all confess) the Church truly is the Body of Christ, then consistently refusing to trust each other becomes a significant issue.  Ask yourself, what does it mean to claim that the Holy Spirit works throughout the entire Church if we hesitate to see that work in traditions different from our own?  Asked another way, are we open to the idea that the Spirit might speak through those whom we do not fully trust?

Well, these are important questions.  Whatever your view, I have little doubt that as Christians we must recognise the importance of truth as we seek it together.  Reid reminds us that trust is our starting point.  Coady insists that without it, knowledge and community themselves are unstable.  In my mind, this suggests that the cultivation of trust and trustworthiness are not peripheral to ecumenism but central to it.  For me, the question is not only what we believe, but in whom are we prepared to trust, when we speak of the things of God.

Author Notes & Further Reading

Thomas Reid (1710–1796)
A central figure in the Scottish Enlightenment, Reid developed common sense realism in response to scepticism.  He argued that certain principles - such as trust in perception and testimony - are foundational to human knowledge and do not require prior proof.

Reid, T. (1764 - modern eds. available) An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense.

C. A. J. Coady (b. 1936)
An Australian philosopher whose work rehabilitated testimony as a fundamental source of knowledge within analytic epistemology, emphasising its social and communal dimensions.

Coady, C. A. J. (1992) Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Onora O’Neill (b. 1941)
A British philosopher whose work has been deeply influential in contemporary discussions of trust, public accountability, and moral obligation.  O’Neill has argued that modern societies often focus excessively on demands for trust while neglecting the question of trustworthiness.  Her work emphasises that trust must be grounded in practices of honesty, competence, transparency, and accountability.
 
O’Neill, O. (2002) A Question of Trust: The BBC Reith Lectures 2002, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 
Concept and article by Dr. Ian Watson, whose lay views are his alone.  He serves as County Ecumenical Officer with responsibilities to promote, support, and provide guidance on Christian Unity throughout Norfolk and Waveney.

The purpose of Ian's regular reflections is to build on the standard arguments for Church unity (scandal of division, Christ’s prayer in John 17, missional inefficiency and so forth) in order to generate fresh intellectual and pastoral energy by offering conceptual frameworks that re-describe unity in ways that feel both rigorous and surprising.  

If you feel moved to comment on his articles, or offer your own reflection on unity, he would be delighted to publish contributions from other Christians.  Simply email him at: nwct-watson@outlook.com

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